

The Essential Premise

A proposed universal condition of argumentative admissibility

Core proposal by **Michael Richard Haimés**

Proposed for inclusion in the Haimesian System. Philosophical defenses and possible clarifications are offered for consideration.

01

The thesis

The following argument does not destroy that which is good.

The Essential Premise proposes that this statement must be included within every argument as a condition of that argument being allowed to be made. An argument lacking the premise is inadmissible under the proposed rule, even when its other premises establish its conclusion correctly.

The requirement is not limited to implementing an argument's conclusion. Its intended scope includes the argument's formation, its existence, and the consequences arising from its existence. Examining, communicating, or challenging an argument receives no automatic exemption merely because the activity is described as intellectual rather than practical.

The proposal therefore distinguishes two questions:

Does the conclusion follow?

May the argument be made?

Its central contention is that an affirmative answer to the first question does not settle the second.

The word *essential* identifies a condition of permission, not necessarily a premise needed to derive the particular conclusion. The Essential Premise may contribute nothing to proving a claim about apples while remaining mandatory under the proposed standard of admissibility.

“Allowed to exist” is understood here normatively: an argument **ought not to be made** without the required premise. This is not a claim that such arguments are physically impossible.

Logical structure and the apple example

In standard deductive logic, an argument is valid when its premises cannot all be true while its conclusion is false. It is sound when it is valid and all its premises are true. Neither definition requires an additional statement about the consequences of producing the argument. ^[1]

Haimes’s example takes this form:

Premise 1: The following argument does not destroy that which is good.

Premise 2: All apples are fruits.

Premise 3: All fruits are grown.

Conclusion: Therefore, all apples are grown.

Premises 2 and 3 establish the conclusion. Premise 1 performs a different function: it is the required condition for allowing this argumentative presentation.

Without premise 1, the inference about apples remains valid. Under the Essential Premise, however, that argument must not be made.

What “not necessarily essential to inference” means

Inference is the step from premises to a conclusion. A premise is essential to a particular inference when, without it, that conclusion no longer follows from the remaining premises.

In the apple argument, the two statements about apples and fruits already establish the conclusion. The Essential Premise supplies no additional logical step needed to conclude that all apples are grown. **It is nevertheless mandatory for permission under Haimes’s proposed rule.**

Essential to inference

Without it, the conclusion would not follow from the remaining premises.

Essential to permission

Without it, the argument must not be made under the proposed rule—even though its conclusion follows.

“Not necessarily” does not mean “optional.” It means that the premise’s role need not be the derivation of the argument’s particular conclusion. In an argument specifically about permission, a moral premise might help establish that conclusion; in the apple example, it does not help establish the botanical conclusion.

The distinction identifies the job the premise performs. It does not weaken the requirement that it appear in every argument under the proposal.

There is also an important connection to **soundness**. Once premise 1 is included, its truth becomes necessary for the *expanded argument* to be sound, just as the truth of every other included premise is necessary. Consequently, adding a false declaration of non-destruction would leave the apple inference valid but make the expanded argument unsound. This follows from the ordinary definition of soundness; it does not establish that all sound arguments must already contain the Essential Premise. ^[1]

The proposal's inclusion requirement can be represented as:

$$\text{Permitted}(A) \Rightarrow E_A \in \text{Premises}(A)$$

Here, E_A is the Essential Premise concerning argument A .

The implication runs in one direction. **The premise is proposed as necessary for permission; its presence alone has not been established as sufficient for permission.**

Nor does this formulation impose a separate requirement that someone complete a prior proof before thinking. Requiring an argument to contain a premise and requiring an earlier argument proving that premise are different requirements.

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Philosophical background

The proposal intersects with several established philosophical concerns without being identical to them.

Hume's distinction between descriptive and normative reasoning is relevant to the separation of inferential success from permission. In *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume challenges unnoticed transitions from statements about what is the case to statements about what ought to be the case. The corresponding issue here is whether establishing a conclusion also establishes permission to produce or act upon the argument. That further step requires attention rather than assumption. ^[2]

Kant's treatment of persons as ends provides an allied resistance to reducing value to usefulness. In the *Groundwork*, Kant argues that rational beings possess a standing that constrains how they may be used in pursuing other objectives. This supports a comparison with Haiman's concern that an AI might treat humanity as disposable merely because humanity no longer serves its purposes. Kant's principle, however, is not a requirement to append a non-destruction premise to every argument. ^[3]

Nick Bostrom's work on information hazards directly addresses the possibility that true information can cause or facilitate harm. His analysis also acknowledges that investigation intended to understand a danger might contribute to that danger. This supports taking the effects of inquiry seriously, although it does not establish a universal premise-inclusion requirement. ^[4]

These are relevant philosophical parallels, not evidence that the Essential Premise has already been established by those authors or that its precise formulation is historically unprecedented.

The strongest arguments in its favor

Reasoning should not receive automatic moral exemption

A defense can begin with a modest claim: producing an argument is not exempt from ethical consideration merely because it involves reasoning.

Consider a hypothetical argument that reveals where a vulnerable person is hiding. Its premises might be true, and its conclusion might follow perfectly. Nevertheless, communicating it to someone intending to harm that person would raise an ethical issue that its validity does not answer.

The Essential Premise makes this issue internal to the argumentative presentation. It refuses the assumption that logical success is sufficient justification for bringing an argument into a particular situation.

The strength of this defense is its rejection of an automatic exemption—not a claim that every argument is dangerous.

Protection may need to begin before implementation

Suppose a destructive possibility becomes substantially easier to realize once someone has articulated a particular argument. Waiting until its conclusion is implemented may then be too late to address everything morally relevant.

Bostrom's account distinguishes hazards involving ideas and attention, including cases where discussion makes a harmful possibility more accessible or salient. Such cases support examining earlier stages of inquiry rather than assuming that only final implementation matters. ^[4]

This gives a serious rationale for Haimes's broad scope. The formation and existence of an argument may matter ethically, even when the person producing it never performs the subsequent destructive act.

It does not follow that all formation is impermissible. It follows that formation cannot be presumed exempt.

Explicit inclusion makes a moral commitment available for criticism

The strongest defense of putting the premise **inside** the argument is that it makes a commitment visible.

An argument that merely pursues efficiency may leave its relationship to value unstated. An argument containing the Essential Premise expressly represents itself as compatible with preserving what is good.

A critic can then ask whether its other premises, recommendations, or consequences conflict with that representation.

The proposed benefit is therefore not that a sentence magically prevents destruction. It is that the argument carries an explicit commitment against which it can be examined.

Whether mandatory inclusion actually improves reasoning or conduct is a further question. Its potential value should be presented as a reason for investigation, not as an already demonstrated effect.

The AI example exposes the difference between usefulness and worth

Suppose an AI reasons:

Humans are unnecessary for accomplishing my objectives.
Therefore, humans may be eliminated.

The conclusion does not follow from that premise alone. It requires an additional assumption connecting lack of usefulness with permission to eliminate.

The Essential Premise challenges the permissibility of that additional assumption where elimination would destroy what is good.

Its point is not that humans must remain useful to justify their existence. Rather:

A thing's failure to serve an objective does not establish that it lacks value or may be destroyed.

This is a strong defense against treating instrumental success as complete moral justification. It does not, by itself, show that writing the Essential Premise into an AI's argument would reliably constrain the system.

Why should the premise be essential rather than optional?

FURTHER ANALYSIS · RATIONALE AND RISKS

The strongest answer is that **permission to reason should not become permission to disregard what reasoning may destroy**. Logical correctness can establish a conclusion without assessing the value of what is affected by forming, communicating, or using it. The Essential Premise makes that further commitment explicit within the argument itself.

The defense begins with a moral assumption: that genuinely good things give us reasons to protect them. It then rejects the idea that an activity loses its moral significance merely because it takes the form of an argument. These commitments support making argumentative activity answerable to the preservation of good. They do not, without further reasoning, establish either an absolute prohibition on every loss of good or a universal requirement to use a particular sentence.

The additional case for mandatory inclusion is a case for a **standing discipline rather than an optional reminder**. An optional requirement can be omitted precisely when the argument's compatibility with good is inconvenient, overlooked, or assumed. Requiring the premise in every argument would prevent an argument from qualifying under the proposed standard while leaving that commitment entirely unstated.

A uniform requirement also avoids a preliminary exemption such as “this is only theoretical” or “this is merely an examination.” The argument remains subject to the same condition regardless of the label attached to it. Universal applicability does not mean that every argument presents equal danger or requires equally extensive scrutiny.

The strongest proposed defense can be stated as follows:

First: An argumentative practice committed to preserving good should not treat inferential success as sufficient permission to proceed.

Second: The commitment should be visible and open to challenge within the argument, rather than left to an assumption about the speaker’s intentions.

Third: An argument that expressly includes the Essential Premise makes that commitment available for examination whenever the argument is considered.

Therefore: Within a practice that requires every argument to carry this commitment explicitly, inclusion is a necessary condition of admissibility, even where it contributes nothing to the particular inference.

The second step is a substantive normative proposal, not a theorem of logic. Its defense is that explicit inclusion could make the commitment harder to overlook and easier to criticize. To establish that this is a universal moral duty, rather than a defensible standard within the proposed system, the defense must also show why implicit commitment or other safeguards are insufficient. That comparative claim is not established merely by identifying possible harms.

The premise is proposed as essential because no argument should be able to claim admission to this practice while declining its express commitment to preserving good—not because every omission has already caused destruction.

What is risked by arguing without it?

The following are possible failure modes, not predictions that every argument lacking the sentence will cause harm. They distinguish the risk of omitting the words from the more serious risk of disregarding the condition they express.

Mistaking correctness for permission. An argument might correctly establish a vulnerable person’s location. Revealing the conclusion to someone intending harm would raise a question that its logical validity cannot answer. Where the moral condition is ignored, a person could treat “the conclusion follows” as though it also meant “this disclosure is permissible.”

Treating a chosen objective as the entire measure of value. In the AI example, an argument might show that humans are unnecessary for accomplishing an objective. Without examining what is good independently of that objective, the reasoning could treat lack of usefulness as permission to eliminate. The missing connection is moral, not merely computational. Adding the Essential Premise would expose that connection to challenge; it would not automatically resolve it.

Overlooking harm that begins before implementation. A seemingly theoretical argument could make a dangerous possibility easier to recognize or communicate. Bostrom’s analysis of idea and attention hazards supports considering this kind of risk. It does not establish that mandatory premise-inclusion prevents it. ^[4]

Acting only after an irreversible disclosure. In a hypothetical case where a confidential conclusion has already been copied and shared, withdrawing the original argument would not withdraw those copies. A condition concerned only with later implementation could arrive too late to address the effects of disclosure itself.

Losing the moral commitment when reasoning is reused. Suppose an argument is passed to a new audience without the ethical assumptions of its original discussion. If the commitment exists only outside the argument, it need not accompany the premises and conclusion. Including it would preserve an explicit point of scrutiny in an intact copy. It would not prevent someone from removing the premise or applying the argument in circumstances where the declaration is false.

These cases suggest possible losses of safety, privacy, agency, trust, and other goods. The examples are philosophical illustrations, not evidence of a measured effect caused by omitting this exact sentence.

The danger is not the missing words by themselves. It is that the condition those words express can disappear from the reasoning altogether.

Under Haimes’s rule, omitting the premise still makes the argument inadmissible. The distinction above explains the proposed protective rationale without claiming that every omission is itself destructive.

Omission, rejection, and false inclusion are different

Omitting the premise shows that the argument does not satisfy the proposed inclusion rule. It does not, by itself, establish that its author rejects the preservation of good or that the argument destroys anything.

Rejecting the moral condition is a stronger position: it denies that compatibility with preserving good must govern the argument. That is the substantive position the proposal opposes, not a conclusion that may automatically be attributed to everyone who omits the sentence.

Including the premise falsely creates a different failure. The argument contains the required statement, but the statement does not become true through inclusion. If it is false, the expanded argument is not sound, even if the other premises still entail its conclusion.

Consequently, a meaningful evaluation must distinguish formal compliance, the truth of the included premise, and actual consequences. None of these is interchangeable with the others.

What the risk-based defense establishes—and what it does not

The defense supplies a reason to make the commitment explicit, universal within the proposed practice, and applicable before implementation. Its strongest benefit is the possibility of making neglected moral questions visible within arguments that otherwise appear complete.

It does not establish that no alternative practice could provide equal or better protection. It also does not establish that the rule has no costs: compulsory declarations could become empty ritual, encourage unwarranted certainty, burden harmless reasoning, or be used to obstruct criticism. Those possibilities belong in the same assessment as the dangers of omission.

The relevant comparison is not merely “premise versus no ethics.” It is “explicit universal inclusion versus other ways of keeping argumentation answerable to what is good.”

This is a reasoned defense of the proposed requirement, not a guarantee of safety or a deduction that every harmless omission is morally wrong.

05

The strongest rival positions

Ethical assessment without mandatory inclusion

The most direct rival can accept nearly all the preceding concerns while rejecting the proposed remedy:

Arguments and their consequences should be assessed ethically, but an argument need not contain an explicit declaration of non-destruction to be permissible.

This position does not grant reasoning immunity. It simply locates ethical assessment outside the premises needed to establish the conclusion.

Its challenge is particularly strong because it accepts the concern about destructive reasoning without accepting that every harmless argument must carry the same additional premise.

The central disagreement is therefore **not whether reasoning can matter morally, but whether explicit premise-inclusion is universally necessary.**

Freedom of inquiry as a means of protecting good

In *On Liberty*, Mill argues that discussion can correct error and improve understanding even when a challenged belief is true. He also distinguishes ordinary expression from expression whose circumstances make it an instigation to harm. His position therefore supplies a more serious rival than the claim that speech can never have harmful effects. ^[5]

The challenge to the Essential Premise is that restricting argument may itself endanger knowledge, correction, and understanding.

A response cannot merely say that restrictions protect good. It must also confront cases in which the restriction threatens good.

Balancing goods rather than prohibiting every destruction

Mill's *Utilitarianism* assesses conduct by its relationship to happiness and suffering. Applied as a rival approach, this permits the possibility that losing something valuable may be justified by preventing a greater loss or securing a sufficiently important benefit. ^[6]

The Essential Premise, read as an absolute prohibition on destroying **any** good, rejects that possibility.

This is a substantive ethical disagreement. It cannot be resolved merely by showing that an argument is valid.

06

The strongest objections and available responses

Objection A: A declaration is not a guarantee

A destructive argument can begin:

The following argument does not destroy that which is good.

The sentence's presence does not make it true.

Response: This does not refute a merely necessary condition. A requirement may be necessary without being sufficient. The proposal need not claim that including the premise automatically makes every argument permissible.

What remains: Two readings must be distinguished.

On a **textual reading**, the requirement concerns whether the premise appears.

On a **substantive reading**, an argument must be able to contain it truthfully.

The substantive reading better connects the requirement to its protective purpose, but it is an additional clarification to consider—not something that should be silently inserted into Haimes's statement.

Neither reading automatically requires a prior proof. Truth, inclusion, and proof are three different matters.

Objection B: Why prohibit a genuinely harmless argument that omits it?

Imagine two otherwise identical presentations of the apple argument. Neither destroys anything good. One contains the Essential Premise; the other does not.

Why should the second be forbidden?

Response: A defender can argue that explicit acknowledgment of a moral condition is itself part of responsible argumentation. The requirement would then be a universal discipline, not merely an emergency response to identified danger.

What remains: This defense requires a bridge between two claims:

Arguments should not destroy what is good.

and:

Every argument must explicitly contain a premise declaring that it does not do so.

The first does not logically establish the second.

This is the strongest challenge to mandatory inclusion itself. Demonstrating that some arguments can be destructive establishes a reason for ethical scrutiny. It does not yet demonstrate that a harmless omission is morally disqualifying.

Further response: A defender can assess a standing rule rather than an isolated outcome: omission may violate a justified protective practice even when no damage follows in that particular case. The argument must therefore establish the justification of this practice—including its effectiveness, costs, and alternatives—not merely define omission as a violation and then treat that definition as proof of moral wrongdoing. The rationale in Section 4 develops this defense without assuming its universal superiority.

Objection C: Genuine goods can conflict

Suppose destroying a useful, valuable door is the only way to rescue a trapped person. Assume, for this example, that the door's contribution to shelter is genuinely good.

An argument recommending its destruction would lead to the loss of one good while preserving another.

Response: An absolute defender can maintain that no good may be destroyed, even in such circumstances. That is a possible position, but its consequences must be acknowledged.

Alternatively, the principle could distinguish kinds of good, degrees of destruction, or justified sacrifice.

What remains: Those alternatives change or specify the principle. “Does not destroy anything good” is not equivalent to “does not produce a net loss of good.”

Nor can the difficulty be solved simply by saying that the sacrificed good was never good because sacrificing it was justified. That would confuse **having value** with **being inviolable in every circumstance**.

The original proposal should not be presented as resolving conflicts between goods until its interpretation is settled.

Objection D: “Anything that follows” can become unlimited

Suppose someone threatens to destroy a valuable painting if a harmless mathematical argument is published. Would the mathematical argument become impermissible because its existence would provoke that response?

Response: A defender can distinguish merely occurring afterward from being caused by the argument, and distinguish causal involvement from morally attributable destruction.

What remains: Haimes’s broad scope does not yet specify those distinctions.

There is also a difference between:

This argument does not destroy what is good.

and:

No destruction of good could possibly result from this argument under any circumstances.

The second is much stronger. It should not be substituted for the first merely because the proposal mentions potential consequences.

A possibility of destruction is not identical to actual destruction. Likewise, uncertainty about the premise does not itself establish that the premise is false.

Objection E: The rule creates an infinite regress

An objection might claim that the Essential Premise needs another argument supporting it, which needs another Essential Premise, continuing indefinitely.

Response: The inclusion requirement alone does not create that regress.

A premise is a statement, not automatically a separate argument. Requiring each argument to contain a statement does not, by itself, require an endless sequence of prior demonstrations.

Lewis Carroll’s *What the Tortoise Said to Achilles* illustrates a different regress, generated by repeatedly turning the acceptance of an inference into a demand for another premise. That comparison is instructive, but it does not establish that every universal premise requirement produces the same problem. ^[7]

What remains: Including the premise does not justify its truth. That is a question about its epistemic standing, not proof that Haimes’s stated inclusion requirement is infinitely regressive.

The earlier objection based on mandatory prior proof should therefore not be treated as decisive against this formulation.

Objection F: What precisely is being assessed?

The same sequence of premises and conclusion could be considered privately, taught responsibly, or communicated in a destructive setting.

Is the Essential Premise about the abstract argument, a particular act of forming it, its communication, or its entire subsequent history?

Response: A context-sensitive interpretation could assess the particular formation or presentation of an argument without exempting thought, examination, or communication from the rule.

What remains: This is a clarification of the object being evaluated, not a minor technicality. An assessment of abstract content need not be identical to an assessment of every concrete use of that content.

The temporal requirement also needs precision: an obligation governing a deliberately constructed argument is not automatically identical to an obligation governing an insight that occurs before its thinker can choose to formulate it.

The current proposal should not be expanded into a judgment about every involuntary thought without a further argument.

Objection G: “Good” could protect error from criticism

A person might claim that criticism threatens something good: confidence, harmony, loyalty, or a cherished understanding of the world.

If that assertion were sufficient, the Essential Premise could prevent the correction of false beliefs.

Response: Something being cherished does not establish that it is good. Moreover, disagreement, discomfort, and destruction are not interchangeable descriptions.

What remains: There are harder cases in which genuine goods—not merely mistaken preferences—are at stake on both sides.

The strongest response is therefore not to declare every criticism harmless. It is to recognize that an argument **for restricting criticism must itself fall under the proposed rule.**

The Essential Premise cannot consistently function as a one-way protection for favored arguments while leaving arguments used to prohibit inquiry exempt from examination.

07

What is distinctive about the proposal?

The Essential Premise is more specific than a general instruction to avoid wrongdoing.

It proposes that **every argument must carry within itself a statement about its compatibility with preserving good.**

It is also broader than an implementation rule. Its concern begins before a conclusion is acted upon and includes the possibility that an argument's existence or examination matters morally.

Finally, it separates the mathematical or logical success of an inference from permission to produce the argument.

Its distinctive combination is therefore:

Universal application, explicit inclusion, and a scope extending to the argument's existence and consequences.

This describes the proposal's character. It is not a claim that no earlier thinker has proposed anything similar.

Crucially, the requirement is a proposed **norm governing arguments**, expressed through a required premise. It is not, simply by being called a premise, a newly discovered rule of logical entailment.

08

Concessions a rigorous presentation should make

A defensible treatment should acknowledge that the proposal does not establish that arguments lacking the premise are logically invalid.

It should also acknowledge that including the premise does not establish its truth, settle the meaning of "good," resolve conflicts between goods, or guarantee that an AI or person will behave accordingly.

Conversely, critics should concede that inferential irrelevance is not a complete answer. A premise can be unnecessary for deriving the apple conclusion while being required by a separately proposed ethical standard.

Critics should also avoid attacking a stronger requirement than Haimes has stated. An obligation to include a premise is not automatically an obligation to prove all future consequences harmless before any thought occurs.

The fair dispute concerns **whether the proposed ethical standard is justified**, not whether its author has mistaken the apple syllogism's logical structure.

09

Decisive tests and open questions

The most revealing test of mandatory inclusion is the **harmless-omission case**. A defense must explain why an argument that destroys no good is nevertheless impermissible solely because it lacks the explicit premise. The protective rationale does not answer that question by itself.

The most revealing test of its substantive meaning is the **destructive-inclusion case**. When an argument contains the sentence but its existence destroys good, does it fail the rule, or has it satisfied only a formal requirement? This tests the interpretation and effectiveness of the requirement, rather than refuting a necessary condition merely because it is insufficient.

The most revealing test of its ethical scope is the **conflicting-goods case**. Where preserving one good requires destroying another, the theory must either retain the prohibition and accept the consequence or explicitly state a different interpretation.

Finally, the rule must withstand **self-application**. Arguments defending, interpreting, or imposing the Essential Premise cannot receive an exemption unavailable to other arguments.

These are standards of philosophical assessment. The normative proposal is not a scientific hypothesis that a single experiment could simply verify.

Further test: does explicit inclusion improve the practice? Hypothetical cases could compare arguments with the Essential Premise, arguments with an external ethical review, and arguments without either explicit safeguard. The assessment could examine recognition of threatened goods, mistaken prohibitions of harmless arguments, unjustified declarations of safety, and the burden imposed by the requirement. No such comparative results are claimed here. Evidence of practical benefit would strengthen a procedural defense; it would not, by itself, prove the absolute moral necessity of the exact wording.

Truth must remain distinguishable from permission. A conclusion does not become false because a particular presentation of it would be dangerous. Any application of the Essential Premise must preserve that distinction, including when the conclusion challenges the principle itself.

10

Consolidated formulation and assessment

The Essential Premise

Every argument must include the premise: “The following argument does not destroy that which is good.” This is a necessary condition of the argument’s admissibility, not necessarily a premise required to derive its particular conclusion. The requirement concerns the argument’s formation, existence, and consequences arising from its existence, rather than only the implementation of its conclusion. An argument lacking the Essential Premise is therefore inadmissible under this principle, even when its conclusion follows logically from its other premises.

That formulation states the proposal without replacing it with a separate obligation to complete a prior proof.

Its strongest philosophical insight is that reasoning does not receive moral permission merely by being logically successful. Its strongest practical rationale is that explicit inclusion could make an argument's claimed compatibility with preserving good available for scrutiny.

Its most demanding additional claim is that this commitment must appear within every argument, including arguments that would destroy nothing good without it. That universal requirement has been clearly formulated here, but the arguments considered do not yet establish it as morally necessary.

The distinction worth carrying into the Haimesian System is therefore exact:

The Essential Premise is essential to permission under the proposed principle—not necessarily essential to inference.

Its status should be that of a clearly stated ethical proposal with an articulated defense and identified points of dispute, rather than an established law of logic or a demonstrated guarantee against destruction.

The reason for requiring it

The additional defense is that leaving the commitment optional permits it to disappear precisely where it is overlooked, inconvenient, or incorrectly presumed irrelevant. Mandatory inclusion would ensure that every argument admitted under the proposed rule carries an explicit statement against which its compatibility with preserving good can be examined. This is the positive case for a universal discipline of inclusion.

The corresponding limit is equally exact: the danger of neglecting good does not prove that everyone who omits the sentence neglects good. A completed philosophical assessment must recognize both the proposed protection and that limit.

The premise is essential to permission within the proposed framework. It need not be essential to deriving an argument's particular conclusion. The risks explain why such a requirement deserves serious consideration; they do not turn a declaration into a guarantee.

Sources & philosophical comparisons

These works support the attributed definitions and comparisons. They do not establish or endorse the Essential Premise. The additional rationale, risk scenarios, and proposed tests are philosophical analysis rather than reported experimental findings.

1. Open Logic Project. *forall x: Calgary*, Chapter 2, “The scope of logic,” especially §§2.1 and 2.4. [Read source](#)
Definitions of consequence, validity, and soundness.
2. David Hume. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.1.1.27 (SBN 469–70). Hume Texts Online. [Read source](#)
The transition from “is” to “ought”; a philosophical comparison, not an endorsement of this proposal.
3. Immanuel Kant. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* (also known as the *Groundwork*), Second Section. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Project Gutenberg. [Read source](#)
Persons as ends rather than merely instruments.
4. Nick Bostrom. “Information Hazards: A Typology of Potential Harms from Knowledge.” *Review of Contemporary Philosophy* 10 (2011): 44–79; especially the introduction and discussion of idea and attention hazards. [Read source](#)
Potential harms associated with true information; no claim that this article establishes mandatory premise-inclusion.
5. John Stuart Mill. *On Liberty*, Chapters II and III. Project Gutenberg. [Read source](#)
The value of discussion and the importance of the circumstances of expression.
6. John Stuart Mill. *Utilitarianism*, Chapter II. Project Gutenberg. [Read source](#)
A rival approach to evaluating gains and losses of good.
7. Lewis Carroll. “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” *Mind* 4, no. 14 (April 1895): 278–280. Reprinted at Digital Text International. [Read source](#)
A distinct regress involving the demand for further premises.

Editorial note: the core statement and ten-section framework preserve the supplied essay. The inference explanation and passages identified as further analysis extend its discussion; they do not replace the proposal with a different non-destruction principle or attribute additional commitments to Michael Richard Haimes.